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PARITY BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR MANDATORY, PERMISSIVE, OR ILLEGAL
SUBJECT?

A

Michael G. Gallaghert
I.

INTRODUCTION

Collective bargaining has evolved as an effective process for facilitating discussion and resolution of employer/employee differences regarding conditions of employment. Congress recognized that because of the
potentially infinite number of conditions of employment, it was necessary
to pass legislation that would limit the scope of collective bargaining.
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' limits the
scope of private sector collective bargaining. The scope of public sector
bargaining is limited by state and federal statutes, which usually are
modeled after section 8(d).2 Courts interpreting public sector statutes
generally follow a tripartite scheme developed by courts interpreting the
NLRA. Under the tripartite scheme, all differences between employer
and employee are categorized as either mandatory, permissive, or prohibited subjects of bargaining. 3

t B.A. University of Delaware 1975; J.D. University of Baltimore School of Law
1980; LL.M. with highest honors George Washington University School of Law,
1986. Mr. Gallagher is a senior attorney with the United States Department of the
Treasury, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
The views contained in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Department of the Treasury.
\. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1912) requires that the employer and the employees "meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment .... "
2. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1684 n.8
(1984). "Yet unlike the NLRA, some public sector bargaining laws contain 'a management rights clause' that explicitly limits the scope of bargaining, typically by
excluding decisions on personnel management, agency efficiency, and the 'mission'
of the agency." Id. at 1684 and n.9.
3. Id. at 1684 n.13. The distinction between mandatory, permissive, and prohibited
bargaining subjects under the NLRA first was explained in NLRA v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1958) and refined in other decisions.
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981); Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689
(1965).
For public sector interpretations of this tripartite framework of bargaining subjects, see National Union of Police Officers Local 502-M v. Board of Comm'rs, 93
Mich. App. 76, 87-90, 286 N.W.2d 242, 247-48 (1979); City of Beloit v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 50-53, 242 N.W.2d 231, 234-36
(1976); see also Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ.
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Mandatory subjects are those subjects over which the parties have a
duty to bargain. During the bargaining phase for mandatory subjects the
parties are entitled to bargain to impasse. 4 The refusal to bargain by
either party constitutes an unfair labor practice. 5 Both employer and
employees are required to bargain in good faith on mandatory subjects;
however, they are not required to reach agreement. 6 Under section 8(d)
of the NLRA, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 7 By definition, any matter
that vitally affects wages, hours, or any other aspect of the relationship
between employer and employee is a mandatory bargaining subject. 8
Under this definition, a wide variety of subjects, including pay and grievance procedures, are deemed mandatory.9
Permissive subjects, on the other hand, provide the employer and
the employees with the choice of whether to bargain. 10 Where a permissive subject is the focus of bargaining, neither the employer nor the employees may utilize impasse resolution procedures - such as a strike by
the employees - to settle a dispute. II During the term of a collective
bargaining agreement, an employer unilaterally may initiate policies involving permissive subjects. I2
Courts have developed a theory, called the management rights doctrine, used to exclude certain subjects from mandatory bargaining. 13 The
management rights doctrine holds that public employers, like their pri-

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.

13.

Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977) (distinguishing bargainable and nonbargainable
subjects).
Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1685
(1984).
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).
National Union of Police Officers Local 502-M v. Board of Comm'rs, 93 Mich.
App. 76, 87, 286 N.W.2d 242,247 (1979). If, however, the failure to reach an agreement on mandatory subjects is because one party insists upon including a proposal
that is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the party insisting upon the proposal
effectively has refused to bargain on the mandatory subjects and is guilty of an unfair labor practice. Borg- Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1912); LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247.
LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247.
See Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 61 Mich. App. 487, 492, 233
N.W.2d 49,52 (1975). The City of Detroit court recited a list of mandatory bargaining subjects which includes the following subjects: hourly rates of pay, overtime
pay, shift differentials, holiday pay, pensions, no-strike clauses, profit sharing plans,
rental of company houses, grievance procedures, sick leave, work rules, compulsory
retirement age, and management rights clauses. Id.
LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247.
Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1685
(1984); see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1685
(1984); see Allied Chern. & Alkali Workers Local No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187-89 (1971). By contrast, an employer's mid-term modification
of mandatory subjects constitutes an unfair labor practice. Allied Chemical, 404
U.S. at 159.
See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 168791 (1984).
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vate sector counterparts, possess certain "management rights" that may
not be the subject of bargaining unless the employers decide to bargain
over them. 14 Management rights, as a general matter, encompass management decisions that are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or that impinge only indirectly upon the employment
security of union members. 15 Under the management rights doctrine the
following subjects are excluded from mandatory bargaining and thus are
deemed permissive subjects of bargaining: insurance benefits for retired
employees, 16 discontinuance of free investment services for bank employees,17 employer contributions to an industry promotional fund,18 price
increases in a company cafeteria,19 and price increases in vending
machine items. 2o
Employers and employees are forbidden to contract over prohibited
subjects. 21 Although the parties are not prevented from discussing prohibited subjects, contract provisions encompassing prohibited subjects
are unenforceable. 22 By definition, a subject is deemed prohibited if enforcement of a contract encompassing the subject would violate a collective bargaining statute or other applicable law. 23 Usually, where
enforcement of a contract provision that deals with an employment subject would violate rights of other employers or employees provided by the
NLRA, courts will hold the subject is prohibited. For example, an agreement between union and management setting uniform labor standards
throughout a particular industry violates the requirement of independent
bargaining units. 24 In a second case that exemplifies this trend, an arbitration agreement providing that the wages of union members in one
state are governed by terms contained in an agreement between a union
in a second state and a division of a company in the second state was
found to violate section 9 of the NLRA,25 which requires bargaining representatives to be selected by a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit.
14. /d.

15. LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247.
16. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No.3 v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129-30,282 N.E.2d 109, 113,331 N.Y.S.2d 17,23 (1972).
17. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1971).
18. NLRB v. Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local No. 2265, 317 F.2d 269 (6th
Cir. 1963).
19. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967).
20. McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970).
21. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1685
(1984).
22. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV.
885, 909 (1973), cited in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich.
44, 54-55 n.6, 214 N.W.2d 803, 808 n.6 (1974).
23. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 54-55 n.6, 214
N.W.2d 803, 808 n.6 (1974).
24. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
25. Sperry Rand v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974); 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
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In the public sector, a "public policy exception" further limits the
scope of bargaining. Under the public policy exception, a subject may be
prohibited even though it relates directly to wages, hours, or the conditions of employment if the subject is deemed to be a matter of public
policy.26 The public policy exception is premised on the rationale that
public employers, unlike their private counterparts, are motivated by
concerns that transcend mere profit-taking: The primary concern of public employers is the provision of adequate service to the general public. 27
The public policy exception is similar in theory to the management
rights doctrine in that certain aspects of the employment relationship are
so important to the employer's goals that they outweigh the potential
detrimental effects to the employees. The public policy exception goes
further than the management rights doctrine, however, by declaring certain matters prohibited subjects of bargaining; public policy determinations may not be removed from the political process and placed on the
bargaining agenda. 28 The rationale behind this exception is that public
policy matters should be determined by the representatives of the voting
pUblic. 29
The rationale behind the public policy exception, the inherent difference in the considerations of public employers versus private employees,
is the reason why the NLRA excludes the public sector from its scope.
Hence, decisions interpreting the NLRA are not dispositive of public employment issues. There are, however, certain subjects of public sector
bargaining that do not involve public policy considerations. For these
subjects the reasons for distinguishing public from private sector do not
apply and private sector decisions are persuasive authority. The issue of
parity bargaining agreements in public employment contracts is one of
the class of subjects to which the public policy exception does not apply.
Parity bargaining agreements are utilized to create parity in the labor market by tying the wages of one bargaining unit with the wages of
one or more other bargaining units contracting with the same employer.
The unit negotiating the clause is labeled the contracting unit; the unit to
which the clause is tied is the reference unit.
Structurally, a parity clause can be either vertical or horizontal. A
vertical parity clause ties the wages of one group of workers with another
26. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1691-96
(1984).
27. Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d
416, 419 (Alaska 1977).
28. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1691
(1984).
29. Id. at 1692. Under the public policy exception, the following subjects, all of which
appeared in teachers' contracts, were held to be prohibited bargaining subjects: relief from nonprofessional duties, class size, teacher load, evaluations of administrators, number of teacher aides and specialists, and the school calendar. Kenai
Peninsula, 1572 P.2d at 424 (appendix containing a complete list of subjects deemed
prohibited, as well as negotiable).
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group of command-superior workers in the same field. For example, a
vertical parity clause might tie the wages of a group of police officers to a
group of police lieutenants. A horizontal parity clause ties the wages of
one group of workers to another similarly situated group in another field.
A horizontal parity clause might be used to tie the wages of a group of
fireman to a group of policemen.
Substantively, a parity clause may be either active or passive. An
active parity clause imposes the terms negotiated by the contracting unit
upon a reference unit. For example, a union and a company in New
York negotiate a contract and the union demands that the contract terms
be applied to the employer's California employees as well. 30 Active parity has been held a prohibited subject of bargaining. 31 In contrast, a passive parity clause maintains parity by tying the wages of the contracting
unit to a reference unit. If the reference unit negotiates a wage increase,
that increase also is given to the contracting unit. In different jurisdictions, passive parity has been declared mandatory, permissive, or
prohibited.
This article analyzes the differing treatment of passive parity clauses
in the public sector by various labor boards and courts. Private sector
treatment of passive parity in cases arising under the NLRA also is examined. Because passive parity directly involves wages and neither violates the bargaining rights of the reference unit nor interferes with any
public policy decisions, passive parity should be a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
II.

HISTORY OF PARITY BARGAINING

Courts traditionally have examined the scope of public sector collective bargaining with an expansive view. Citing unequivocal public policy
as support for its decision, the New York Court of Appeals declared in
Board of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teachers 32 that
the obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions of employment is a broad and unqualified one, and there is no reason
why the mandatory provision of that act should be limited, in
any way, except in cases where some other applicable statutory
provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public employer from making an agreement as to a particular term or
condition of employment. 33
This ultra expansive view that collective bargaining covers all subjects not prohibited by statute has been limited in subsequent decisions.
30. See Sperry Rand v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
31. !d.
32. 30 N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972) (interpreting the Taylor
Law, which requires the public employer to negotiate collectively with recognized
employee organizations as to the terms and conditions of employment).
33. Id. at 129-30,282 N.E.2d at 113,331 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
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In Syracuse Teachers Association, Inc. v. Board of Education, 34 the New
York Court of Appeals imposed on collective bargaining limitations
flowing from "plain and clear, rather than express prohibitions in the
statute or decisionallaw."35 In two cases decided in 1975, the New York
Court of Appeals provided a standard for determining the proper scope
of collective bargaining. In Union Free School District, Town of Cheektowoja v. Nyquist,36 the court stated that prohibitions on the scope of
collective bargaining may derive from "objectively demonstrable public
policy" as expressed in imperative provisions of other laws. 37 In Susquehanna Valley School District v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Association,38 the same court held that prohibitions in collective bargaining
include those subjects barred by public policy, whether explicit or implicit in statute, decisional law, or both. 39
Although these decisions served as a retreat from the ultra expansionist decision of Board of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teachers,4D the retreat was more procedural than substantive. These decisions
merely acknowledged that clear prohibitions on the scope of collective
bargaining could be inferred from other statutes and decisional law. Pervading all of these decisions, however, is the substantive expression that
public policy mandates a broad scope of collective bargaining.
The courts of other states also have concluded that public policy
requires a broad scope of collective bargaining. Courts in both Wisconsin41 and California42 have held that an expansive view of the scope of
collective bargaining carries out the public policy of equipping the state
employer with the resources to compete actively in the labor market.
These courts further have suggested that, in order to compensate the
public employees for their lack of a right to strike, the scope of collective
bargaining subjects should be broader in public employment than in private employment. 43
Parity clauses were first adopted under the expansive view of public
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

35 N.Y.2d 743, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974).
[d. at 743, 320 N.E.2d at 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
38 N.Y.2d 137, 341 N.E.2d 532, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975).
[d. at 143, 341 N.E.2d at 535, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975).
[d. at 616-17, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
30 N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin formed its view of the public policy requirements
in the following manner:
[T]here are three major interests involved in collective bargaining in state
employment: that of the public; that of the state employee; and that of the
state as employer. The legislature has further declared that orderly and
constructive employment relations for state employees and the efficient administration of state government promote all of these interests.
Wisconsin Dep't of Admin. v. WERC, 90 Wis. 2d 426, 430, 280 N.W.2d 150, 153
( 1979).
42. San Joaquin County Employees Ass'n v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App. 3d
83, 87-88, 113 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (1974).
43. San Juan Teachers Ass'n v. San Juan Unified School Dis!., 44 Cal. App. 3d 232,
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sector collective bargaining. In most jurisdictions, parity clauses have
been a long favored element in collective bargaining agreements. 44 In
New York, parity clauses tying the wages of firemen to those of policemen can be traced to the collective bargaining agreements of the early
1900's.45

Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of New York illustrates
both the use and adoption of parity clauses. 46 In Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association, the City of New York had executed collective bargaining
agreements with unions representing three distinct units: policemen, police sergeants, and fire lieutenants. One of the agreements contained a
vertical parity clause tying the wages of policemen to police sergeants. 47
When the sergeants' wages were raised, the policemen sought a wage
adjustment in accordance with the negotiated parity agreement. The
City refused to grant the adjustment, and the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association filed suit.
At trial, the City did not assert that the parity agreement was illegal;48 rather, it argued that the interlocking parity agreements rendered
the contract impossible to perform. 49 The City argued that the interlocking nature of the agreements would cause an interminable spiral of wage
increases, because granting an increase in wages to one unit necessarily
would cause the other units' wages to be raised accordingly. The City
contended that the spiralling effect would continue ad infinitum. 50
In dismissing the City's defense, the trial court applied general contract law, not labor principles, to define the duties that arose under the
collective bargaining agreement. 51 The court stated that the field of labor
relations is one in which contracts are forged through the bargaining process and, therefore, such a contract must be respected, even if the con-

44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

50.

5!.

249, 118 Cal. Rptr. 662, 670-71 (1974); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No.
320 v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 415, 225 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1975).
See Lafranchise & Liebig, Collective Bargaining for Parity in the Public Sector, 32
LAB. L.J. 598, 599 (1981).
In re City of New York, 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 10-3003, 10-3011; 694
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 42, 45 (1977).
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2634 (N.Y.), on remand, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3087 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
Id. at 2294.
Id. at 2295.
Id. at 2296. The impossibility argument was raised in the City's counterclaim. The
City raised two formal defenses: 1) no formal contract; and, 2) the participation of
the patrolmen in a panel hearing was a condition precedent. The court dismissed
these defenses summarily. Id. at 2294-95.
Id. at 2296. In response to this argument the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association
(PBA) responded that an ad infinitum spiral could not occur because the term of
the agreement expired in 1970, and the PBA offered to waive its right to more thall
one raise.
Id. at 2297; see also Note, The Negotiability of Parity Agreemellts ill Public Sector
Collective Bargaining, II FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139 (1982).
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tract proves to be onerous, expensive, or the result of miscalculation. 52
In Patrolmen's Benevolent Association the parity clauses contained in
the collective bargaining agreements were enforced rigidly. The court
refused to excuse the City from performance, no matter how burdensome
that performance might be to the City. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association is exemplary of the early viewpoint that, when a City voluntarily
negotiates a wage term, contract law requires the enforcement of that
contract term.
III.

PRIVATE SECTOR TREATMENT OF PARITY

Parity agreements also have been used extensively in the private sector. Although there are distinctions between private and public sector
labor law,53 decisions arising under the NLRA are instructive in the resolution of public sector labor issues provided that there is no conflict
between the particular private and public policies to be achieved. 54 Decisions regarding parity provisions arising under the NLRA are applicable
to public employment contracts because most state statutes have adopted
the statutory provisions of the NLRA. 55
The key factor in determining the legality of parity clauses under the
52. The court stated:
By its own voluntary act in equating the salaries of Sergeants and Fire
Lieutenants, [the City] set in motion the conditions preceding the Patrolmen's increase. In an early English decision it was established that where
the law creates a duty or imposes a charge and the party is disabled to
perform it without his fault, the law will excuse him, but where he creates
a duty by his own contract, he is bound to make good, notwithstanding
any accident against it by his contract. This agreement was drawn by
skilled draftsmen with long experience in their field and the burdens later
discovered could well have been foreseen and provided against.
75 L.R.R.M. at 2297.
53. The differences between public sector and private sector labor law arise because the
government is the public sector employer. Unlike private sector employers, the government in its role as employer must respond to pressure from economic market
forces as well as the various factions involved in the political process. See Summers,
Public Sector Bargaining: Problems In Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 669 (1975); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L. J. 1156, 1159, 1167-68 (May 1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of
Collective Bargaining In Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1119 (June 1969).
To insure the orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative government and to preserve the ability of elected representatives to make budgetary allocations, free from the disruptive activites of public employees, the concerted activities
of public employees must be regulated. In the private sector, however, there is no
compelling countervailing reason for enacting similar regulation. See City of New
York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175,243 N.E.2d 128,295 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968).
54. See Lullo v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d
681 (1970).
55. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1680
(1984); see, e.g., Local 1522, In1'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Board of Labor Relations,
31 Conn. Supp. 15, 19,310 A.2d 511, 514 (1973); Firefighters Ass'n, Local 785 v.
City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 161 (Me. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5423
(Supp. 1983) (teachers), 345.050 (I)(e) (Supp. 1983) (firefighters); MICH. COMPo
LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 1978); see also State Public Employee-Management
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NLRA is the effect of the clause upon future negotiations. A parity
clause violates the NLRA only when it imposes wages and benefits by
"straight-jacketing" the reference union in future negotiations, through
an active parity clause. If the parties to future negotiations maintain the
ability to negotiate, however burdened that ability might be, the parity
clause should be not only a permissible but also a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
In General Teamster, Warehouse & Dairy Employees, Local Union
126,56 the National Labor Relations Board reviewed an unfair labor
practice charge concerning parity. During contract negotiations, the
union insisted upon a parity provision tying the wages of its members to
the wages paid to similar craftsmen of a different employer in another
city. General Teamster clearly is distinguishable from the public sector
cases because the parity clause at issue did not burden negotiations between the referent craftsmen and their employer. In fact, the parity provision had no effect upon the reference unit. General Teamster is
noteworthy, however, for its illustration of the beneficial aspects of parity
and its analysis regarding the demarcation between prohibited and permissive parity clauses.
Reviewing the union's demands, the Board found that parity was a
mandatory subject of bargaining because it affected wagesY Specifically,
the Board held that it was not unusual for collective agreements to provide for a fluctuating wage structure that varied in accordance with external factors such as the government's cost of living indices. 58 The
Board equated the reference in the craftsmen's contract to another
union's wage package with the common practice of tying wage raises to a
governmental index and ruled that a parity clause was consistent with
the NLRA. The Board noted that parity agreements are condemned
only when they interfere with future negotiations by "straight-jacketing"
parties that are entering into negotiations. 59 Under the General Teamster
court's analysis, parity agreements thus are subject to disapproval only
when wages are imposed on other parties. 60
The Board's focus in determining the legality of parity bargaining is
upon the term "imposition." A parity agreement imposes a wage package when, by agreement with the contracting union, the employer contractually binds itself to enforce a predetermined wage package upon the
reference union in future negotiations. By imposing wages upon future
labor parties, those parties are "straight-jacketed" and cannot negotiate
because no terms or conditions concerning wages remain to be bargained
"Collective Negotiatiol/.\·'· Act, I Gov'T EMPI.. RI'I .. REP. (BNA) 51 :215 to :219
(1970) (presenting comprehensive model state public employment rdations bill).
56. 176 N.L.R.B. 406 (1969).
57. /d. at 407.
58. ld. at 407-08.
59. ld. at 408.
60.ld.
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between the parties. By operation of the parity clause, the terms of a
future agreement between the employer and a separate bargaining unit
have been predetermined. If, however, in the future the parties can negotiate terms and conditions that affect wages, the parity clause is lawful
because the parties are not "straight-jacketed."
In General Teamster, for example, the parity clause merely required
the employer to grant its union employees any superior benefit gained by
other employees during subsequent negotiations. The clause did not impose its wage package upon the reference unit, nor did the clause impose
all of the terms of the latter agreement upon the first. Instead of an automatic mechanism, the parity clause acted as a contingency. If the reference union received a better package, then the benefits would apply to
the first union. If, however, the reference unit did not receive a better
package, the contingency mechanism would not operate, and the original
agreement would apply. Because the parity clause operated only as a
contingency to pass on better benefits, the clause did not "straightjacket" future negotiations between the reference union and the employer. Thus, the Board ruled that the parity clause was consistent with
the NLRA.61
A reversed parity scheme was before the NLRB in Dolly Madison
Industries, Inc. 62 The employer insisted upon a clause that would grant
him the option of adopting the provisions of any future agreement that
contained more favorable wage and benefit terms negotiated between the
union and other employers.63 The union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB in order to test the legality of the clause and
management's right to insist to point of impasse on inclusion of the
clause. 64 In rejecting the union's charge of an unfair labor practice, the
Board held that the clause was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 65 The
Board reasoned that the clause did not breach the NLRA, because the
clause did not impose any wage or benefits upon other parties or strip
those parties of their full negotiating rights. 66 Specifically, the Board
held that the clause was merely an effort by the employer to provide for a
contractual contingency that would relieve him of the disadvantages that
might result in the event that the union negotiated more favorable wage
and benefit levels with future employers. 67 The Board further held that
the clause did not "straight-jacket" the union in its future negotiations
61. lei. at 409.
62. 182 N. L. R. B. 1037 (1970).
63. The contract provision, generally referred to as a Most Favored Nations Clause,
provided that if the union did make such an agreement with a competing employer.
the employer's collective bargaining agreement automatically would be amended to
give the employer tho: full benefit of the terms of the new agreement. lei.

64. lei.
65. lei. al 1038. The importance in the distinction between permissive and mandatory
subjects of bargaining is that mandatory subjects may be bargained to the point of
impasso:. Sue supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text.
66. 182 N.LR.B. at 1042.
67. lei. at 1038.
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with other employers.68
In contrast to the courts' acceptance of passive parity in the private
sector, the courts expressly and impliedly have declared that active parity
clauses are prohibited. The Second Circuit highlighted the distinction
between passive parity and active parity in Sperry Rand v. NLRB.69 The
employer executed a collective bargaining agreement with the union covering all technical employees in the New York area and subsequently
opened a small office in California staffed by draftsmen recruited solely
from the California area. 70 The union discovered that the draftsmen performed work similar to that performed by union draftsmen in New York
and insisted that its New York contract covered all employees, including
those in California. 71 Although the union previously had lost a representation election regarding the California employees, the union insisted
that its New York contract established a minimum wage and benefits
scale for those California employees.72
In holding that the union had committed an unfair labor practice
under the NLRA, the court adopted a unit exclusiveness analysis. 73 The
court held that a union commits an unfair labor practice when it attempts covertly to gain recognition as the bargaining agent of another
unit, recognition that the union might not, and in this case did not, gain
in a representation election. 74 The court analogized the situation sub
judice to one where an employer attempts to impose on the employees of
one unit the contract and bargaining agent of another unit. 75 The court
concluded that, because the employer could not have complied with the
68. /d.
69. 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
70. The company did transfer several members of the Engineers Union, which had a
contract similar to the draftsmen's contract, from New York to California. As a
result, the company recognized the Engineers Union as the representative of both
the assigned and newly hired engineers. [d. at 65 n.1.
71. [d. at 65.
72. [d. at 66-67.
73. The court initially determined that the California employees constituted a bargaining unit separate from the New York unit. Next, the court concluded that there was
not enough evidence to support the New York unit's claim that its efforts were
motivated by a desire to protect the job security of the New York employees. not by
a desire to represent the California employees. Because there were two exclusive
bargaining units, and the apparent motive of the New York unit was to represent
the members of a separate unit, the court found that the general rule that separate
units have the exclusive right to bargain for members of their unit was violated. Id.
at 68.
74. Id. at 68-69.
75. The court stated:
We also hold that, regardless of the Union's motive in seeking enforcement of the arbitration award, it committed an unfair labor practice because the subject of the wages and working conditions of the Vallejo
employees was not a permissible subject of bargaining in the New York
City unit. Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to organize
and bargain collectively and the right (0 refrain from such activities. Generally, an employer commits the unfair labor practices of interfering with
employees' § 7 rights and supporting a union in violation of § 8(a)( 1) and
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arbitrator's award without infringing upon the rights of the California
employees in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(2)16 of the NLRA, the
union's attempt to make it do so constituted "a failure to bargain collectively in violation of section 8(b)(3)77 of the [NLRA]'''78
The concept of "refusal to bargain" is a useful ground for distinguishing passive parity cases, such as Dolly Madison Industries, Inc.,
from active parity cases like Sperry Rand. Under a passive parity clause
the employer merely agrees to provide the contracting unit with superior
benefits that in the future might be procured by the reference unit; however, under an active parity clause the employer agrees with the contracting unit to refuse to bargain with the reference unit. Such an
agreement violates the requirement, stated in section 8(b)(3) of the
NLRA, that the employer bargain collectively with each unit.
In its decision, the Sperry Rand court cited United Mine Workers v.
Pennington 79 for the proposition that an employer cannot bargain with a
union over the wages that the union subsequently will negotiate with
other employers. 8o The United Mine Workers decision, although it did
not contain the term "active parity", discussed a nationwide conspiracy
between a union and several large coal operators to impose agreed-upon
wage scales upon smaller, nonunion operators, a scheme that allegedly
violated antitrust laws. The defendant operators in United Mine Workers argued that the wage agreement was protected from antitrust scruntiny by the NLRA's policy of promoting "the peaceful settlement of
industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the
mediatory influence ofnegotiation."81 The Court, however, held that the
agreement was not protected by federal labor laws. 82
In reaching its conclusion, the United Mine Workers Court reasoned
that, although obtaining uniform labor standards was a legitimate aim of

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
SI.
82.

(a)(2) when it imposes on employees of one unit the contract and bargaining agent of another unit.
/d. at 69 (omitting cited cases).
Sections 8(a)(l) and (2) of the NLRA provide the following:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, that subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without
loss of time or pay.
Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents ... to refuse to bargain collectively with an em·
ployer, provided it is the representative of his employees .... "
492 F.2d at 70.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Sperry Rand, 492 F.2d at 70.
United Mille Workers, 391 U.S. at 664.
/d. at 666-68.
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any labor organization, nothing in the labor policy indicated that the
union and employers in one bargaining unit were free to bargain about
the wages, hours, and working conditions of others units. 83 The Court
held that a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it
agrees with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units; to hold otherwise would violate the duty to bargain unit
by unit, by not allowing the other units to bargain independently over
wages. In the words of the Court, such an agreement "straight-jackets"
the other units in future negotiations. 84
A comparison of Dolly Madison Industries, Inc. with Sperry Rand
and United Mine Workers illustrates that for a parity clause to be prohibited under the NLRA, enforcement of the parity clause must require that
the employer breach its duty to bargain collectively with each separate
bargaining unit. In Sperry Rand and United Mine Workers, enforcement
of the parity clauses would have required the employer to enforce the
agreed-upon terms of a contract negotiated with one contracting unit on
another unit. To enforce a wage or benefit provision on any unit without
collectively bargaining over that provision constitutes a refusal to bargain
in violation of section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.
In contrast, the parity clause at issue in Dolly Madison merely required that if the union made an agreement with a competing employer
containing terms more favorable to the employer, the original agreement
would be amended to include those terms. This is analogous to a passive
parity clause. Enforcement of such an agreement does not require a refusal to bargain by any unit, and therefore is not only a permissive subject of bargaining, but a mandatory subject of bargaining as well in the
private sector.
IV.

PARITY AGREEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Notwithstanding the validity of passive parity clauses in the private
sector, there has been a succession of successful attacks upon the use of
both active and passive parity clauses in the public sector. The first case
to question the validity of parity clauses in the public sector was In re
Uniformed Fire Officers Association,85 decided by the New York City
Board of Collective Bargaining. There, interlocking collective bargaining
agreements between policemen, firemen, and supervisors contained both
vertical and horizontal parity clauses. The City alleged that both types
of parity clauses were prohibited or were, at best, merely permissive subjects of bargaining. 86 In reviewing the City's charge, the Board observed
that traditionally the City and its employees had engaged in the practice
83. /d. at 666.
84. Id. at 665-66.
85. Nos. BCB-116-72, BCB 118-72, Dec. No. B-14-72 (N.Y. City Bd. of Collective Bargaining Aug. 2, 1972).
86. Id. at I.
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of comparability bargaining. 87 The Board noted that the practice had
endured for nearly eighty years.88 Nevertheless, the Board recognized
that the City's allegations posed serious and complex legal questions. x9
These issues were so complex and novel that the Board deferred its decision. 90 This case is noteworthy as the first case to suggest that parity
agreements were vulnerable to attack.
The Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations was next to address
the validity of parity agreements in In re City of New London. 91 The City
had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with its firemen, which
included a passive parity clause providing for parity with a police unit. 92
The reference police union filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the City, arguing that the parity clause "by its very presence and necessary operation puts undue pressure on the City to refuse police demands
that exceed the benefits in the Firefighters' contract and also makes the
Police Union, without its consent, a bargaining agent for the Firefighters
as well as the policemen. "93
In holding that the parity clause unlawfully interfered with the negotiating rights of the reference unit, the Board found that the presence
of the parity clause in the firemen's contract caused police negotiators to
carry a "double load - in effect ... negotiating for the firemen as well as
for their own members. "94 The Board recognized that parity is a fact of
life for municipalities because the City always examines the future impact of its agreements on other labor sources. The Board, however,
found the parity clause distinguishable because it forced the City to act in
a prescribed manner, rather than be free to negotiate the issues later.
The Board reasoned that, because of the automatic consequences of the
parity clause, the City would be less likely to view the reference unit's
proposals on their own merits than if only a moral obligation applied. 95
87. Jd. at 5.
88. Id.
89. /d. at 6.
90.ld.
91. III re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP2268, MUPP 2343, Dec. No. 1128
(Conn. St. Bd. of Labor ReI. Apr. 10, 1973, 505 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F1 (1973).
92. The parity clause provided:
Any increase in wages which is granted to any employee of the Police
Department, which is greater than that received by any employee of this
Bargaining Unit who has the same relative length of service in a comparable rank to that held by such Police Department employee, shall be simultaneously granted and effective for such Bargaining Unit employee, and
shall be in addition to the provisions of this agreement. . .. [T]he term
"increase in wages" shall mean and include any increase in salary and any
additional payment for services currently being performed, and any provision for and/or any increase in night shift premium.
Id.
93. Id., slip op. at 3, 505 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at F-3.
94.ld.
95. Id. at F-4.
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The Board therefore held that the parity clause interfered with the police
reference unit's exercise of untrammeled bargaining rights.l)o
In analyzing this decision, it is important to note that the "double
loading" concept, which focuses on the burden placed on the reference
union's negotiating posture through the use of a passive parity clause, is
distinguishable from the concept of "straight-jacketing" the reference
union through the use of an active parity clause of the type found objectionable in the private sector cases. The "double loading" concept posits
that the bargaining rights of the reference union named in a passive parity clause are burdened in two respects. First, the passive parity clause,
which mandates parity between the contracting union and the reference
union, undermines the reference union's bargaining position in subsequent negotiations. As a practical matter, during subsequent negotiations with the reference union, the employer must consider the economic
effect of providing the requested benefits to the contracting union as well.
This practicality makes it more difficult for the reference union subsequently to negotiate an increase in benefits. Second, the reference union
essentially functions as bargaining agent for the contracting union, because any increase in benefits secured by the reference union will pass to
the contracting union.
A passive parity clause forces the employer to consider and evaluate
the economic package in terms of both the reference union and the contracting union. The employer remains under a duty to bargain with the
reference unit. By contrast, an active parity clause forces the employer
to agree to a predetermined economic package and to refuse to bargain
with the reference unit.
In City of New London, the Board did not discuss the distinction
between the "double loading" and "straight-jacketing" concepts. The
Board, however, did address what it termed the "facts of life" of collective bargaining: the employer weighs the effects of granting concessions
to one union upon future negotiations with other unions. 97 The Board
did not find parity per se objectionable. Rather, the Board found the
passive parity clause in the firemen's contract objectionable because it
would interfere with the policemen's right to untrammeled bargaining. 98
The Board's holding implies that an employer can disregard the "fact of
life" considerations and view the reference unit's proposals as if in a vacuum. Such a suggestion is inconsistent with the actual conduct of labor
negotiations. Prudent employers make such evaluations regardless of the
presence of a parity clause. 99 A parity clause merely expresses in contract terms the "fact of life" that employers evaluate the cost of solitary
labor agreements in light of their effect upon overall labor costs. Thus,
the Board erred by equating the "fact of life" evaluative considerations
96.
97.
98.
99.

[d.
[d.
[d.
See G. NIERENBERG, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING 79-108 (1968).
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exercised by an employer with the "straight-jacketing" that occurs when
the employer is forced to impose a predetermined economic package
upon the reference union.
A reference union named in a passive parity clause, such as the policemen's union in City of New London, is burdened in its negotiating
posture with the employer. This burden, however, is present in any bargaining relationship. The burden flows not from the presence of the parity clause, but from the "facts of life" inherent in negotiating labor
agreements. Although the burden may be somewhat heavier as a result
of the parity clause, the increase does not "straight-jacket" the parties.
Enforcement of the clause does not require the City to refuse to bargain
with the reference union.
The Board stated that another distinction between a parity clause
and fact of life pressures is that a parity clause requires concessions be
made to the contracting unit as soon as they are negotiated with the reference unit, even though the contracting unit's contract may have a year
or more to run. lOG This statement implies that "fact of life" pressures are
existent only during the period of negotiations for the contracting unit's
contract.
This statement also ignores the actual conduct of labor relations.
Even if the contracting unit's contract still has a year or more to run, the
City knows that if it gives the reference unit a raise it will be pressured to
give the contracting unit the same raise eventually. The pressure comes
at the time of the bargaining of the reference unit's contract, whether
there is an actual legal obligation created by a parity clause or merely a
moral obligation created by the "fact of life" pressures.
In summary, the Board held that parity clauses interfere with the
untrammeled bargaining rights of the reference union by unduly burdening the reference union with the interests of the contracting union. lOl
The Board limited this holding, however, by declaring that parity agreements are not void per se, but are valid only where the reference union
consents. 102
The Board's decision in City of New London was appealed to the
100. In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268, MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128
(Conn. St. Bd. of Labor ReI. Apr. 10, 1973) (slip op. 4), 505 GOV'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) F-3.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court noted:
To emphasize the narrow scope of our ruling, let us point out clearly certain things:
-We are not deciding that parity between policemen and firemen is
forbidden by the Act, or that it is wrong or undesirable.
-We are not deciding that the existence of a parity clause in and of
itself constitutes a violation of the Act under all circumstances.
-We are not holding that the Act forbids the police and fire units to
agree upon parity, or to bargain jointly for benefits with an understanding
that they are to be equal.
[d.
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Connecticut Court of Common Pleas. 103 Upholding the Board, the court
viewed the parity clause as a far more insidious matter. Although the
Board had held that the effect of the parity clause was to place an unlawful burden upon the negotiating rights of the reference union, the court
held that the clause stripped the union of all negotiating rights. 104 Thus,
the court repeated the Board's error by treating the employer's "fact of
life" evaluative considerations as a "straight-jacketing" of the parties.
The emphatic language used by the court further illustrates the court's
failure to distinguish active from passive parity. 105 Stating that the reference union had been stripped of all negotiating rights, the court treated
this passive parity agreement as imposing a wage package upon the reference union. This was not the case; the clause merely provided the first
unit with benefits achieved by the second unit during its negotiations
with the City.
Other decisional tribunals have relied upon the City of New London
cases when addressing the legality of parity clauses in the public sector.
For example, the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission held parity clauses illegal in Town of Methuen, Police & International Brotherhood of Police Officers. 106 The town had maintained parity between the
police department and other town departments. When the reference
unit, the police union, filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Commission held that the parity clause forced the reference union to act as the
representative for both unions and the parity clause thereby unlawfully
interfered with the bargaining rights of the reference union. 107 In essence, the Commission adopted the "double loading" language and analysis of City of New London.
During the period when public employment relations agencies in
Massachusetts lO8 and Connecticut lO9 had begun the assault on parity
bargaining, New York courts remained steadfast in their approval of parity clauses. I 10 In In re City of Albany, III however, the New York Public
Employment Relations Board joined the retreat from parity clause ac103. Local Union No. 1522, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Connecticut State Bd., 31 Conn.
Supp. 15, 319 A.2d 511 (1973).
104. Id. at 18,319 A.2d at 513. It is in this aspect of the case that the Board leveled its
most telling and damaging charge against the parity clause. The Board reasoned
that prior to opening negotiations with the city, the police union's bargaining power
was restricted severely in that the union already was bound by the Firemen's contract. On this issue, the police union's right to bargain had been taken from it. Id.
105. Id. The court stated that the parity agreement would "impose equality for the future upon another group ... which has had no part in making the agreement." Id.
106. MLRC No. MUP-507 (Mass. Labor ReI. Comm'n Jan. 24,1974),545 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) B-15 (1974).
107.Id.
108. See id.
109. See In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268, MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128
(Conn. State Bd. of Labor ReI. Apr. 10, 1973), 505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
F-l (1973).
110. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970), rev'd, 76
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ceptance. In that case, firefighters sought parity with a police unit.
Although parity bargaining previously had been held to be a mandatory
subject of negotiations, the Board declared that the subject was permissive only. 112 The Board cited two controlling factors for its decision: (a)
those seeking parity wished to be silent partners in the city's negotiations
with the reference unit; and (b) parity clauses could improperly inhibit
negotiations between the city and the reference unit itself.113 Although it
did not refer to the City of New London, the Board adopted that case's
"double loading" rationale. The Board, however, did not adopt the remedy granted in City of New London. Instead of prohibiting parity clauses,
the Board merely declared them to be permissive subjects of bargaining.
In Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations Board, 114 the Supreme
Court of Connecticut adopted both the rationale and the remedy of City
of New London. In Local 1219, firefighters sought enforcement of an
arbitrator's award requiring parity between fire and police units. I IS The
city argued that the passive parity clause was void. 116 The Supreme
Court of Connecticut, deferring to the Board's experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge, held that the Board's conclusion
that the parity clause unlawfully interfered with the reference unit "was
not based on caprice or whim and could have been reasonably drawn
from the evidence."117 The court based its decision on two grounds:
first, the parity clause interfered with, restrained, and coerced the right of
the reference unit to untrammeled bargaining; 118 second, the parity
clause interfered with the exclusivity of the bargaining units.119 The
court also adopted the holding of the City of Albany, that parity clauses
are permitted only when the reference unit has given its consent. 120
Taking a different approach to the invalidation of parity clauses, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, invalidated a passive parL.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087 (N.Y.), on remand, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.), 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
Ill. 7 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 7-3079, 587 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-12
(1976).
112. For a discussion of the distinction between permissive and mandatory subjects of
bargaining, see supra text accompanying notes 4-20.
113. Id.
114. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976).
115. Id. at 347, 370 A.2d at 955.
116.Id.
117. Id. at 348, 370 A.2d at 957.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court reasoned:
On this issue, the police union's right to bargain has been completely taken
from it. By voiding parity clauses in circumstances similar to those found
in the present case, the defendant Board preserves the wall of separation
mandated by the statute. The defendant's action will also ensure that the
units will be allowed to tie themselves to a rule of equality only if each unit
agrees with the other that its interests are the same.
Id.
120. Id.
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ity clause because of its interference with the city's bargaining rights in
Doyle v. City of Troy. 121 In Doyle, a firefighter's union sought compliance
with a city charter provision mandating that the minimum salaries of
firemen be equal to those of policemen at comparable grades. \22
The court invalidated the parity provision of the city charter because of its conflict with state civil service law, which required full negotiations between the city and the bargaining unit regarding wages and
other terms and conditions of employment. 123 The court reasoned that,
because the ordinance infringed upon the city's full bargaining right by
setting a minimum salary for firemen, the effect was to prohibit negotiations on the subject of wages. This rendered the ordinance invalid under
the civil service law. 124
The nature of the party whose rights were impaired distinguishes
Doyle from the earlier cases. Unlike the earlier cases, the court did not
examine the effect of the parity clause upon any reference union. The
decision, however, supports the earlier view that parity clauses impose
conditions upon other parties in contravention of the public policy of
facilitating untrammeled negotiations between a municipality and a
union.
In Voight v. Bowen,125 the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, amplified the need to mesh provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement with the letter of the civil service statute. In Voight, the City
of Long Beach had executed a passive parity agreement with its police
force tying the wage scale of the police to that in effect between Nassau
County and its police force. 126 The court invalidated the parity agreement. Viewing the parity provision as a means to resolve a wage dispute
between Long Beach and its police unit, the court reasoned that the parity provision was the equivalent of the impasse arbitration scheme established by state statute. 127 The provision was invalidated because it did
not contain mandatory subjects for consideration by the arbitrator as required by the state statute that set out the impasse arbitration scheme,
such as the ability of Long Beach to pay and the general wage structure
of the community.128 The court held that the parity provision was unlawful because it provided for resolution of pay disputes through reference to wages paid by Nassau County, a resolution not authorized by the
statute. 129
Voight is noteworthy in several respects. First, it is distinguishable
121. 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976).
122. /d. at 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
123. Id. (referring to Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law), N.Y. elv.
SERVo LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973».
124. 51 A.D.2d at 847, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
125. 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1976).
126. /d. at 278, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
127. /d. at 279, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
128. Id. at 280, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
129. /d.
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from the preceding cases because the parity provision in Voight was tied
to a reference unit employed by a separate governmental employer. Because no employer was common to both the contracting and reference
units, there was no meaningful opportunity for the court to address the
degree of interference that the parity provision would exert on the reference union's negotiating rights.
Second, Voight is the only reported case to treat a parity bargaining
clause as a substitute for impasse resolution. The Voight court, equating
a negotiated agreement calling for parity with an impasse that leads to
arbitration, overlooked the distinction between agreement and impasse.
The parties had agreed to provide for an external mechanism to adjust
future wage rates during the life of the agreement; therefore, the parity
provision was not a substitute for impasse resolution, but an agreement
to adjust future wages. An impasse regarding an "interests dispute"
arises only when the parties cannot agree to the content of a proposed
agreement. 130 In this case, however, the parties mutually agreed to the
procedure to adjust wages; because there was no disagreement, there
could not have been an impasse.
Finally, the decision is noteworthy as a departure from the contract
law principles followed in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of
New York. l3l By voluntarily executing the agreement, Long Beach had
consented to the parity procedure. Through an erroneous definition of
impasse, the court permitted Long Beach to repudiate its contractual
duty to maintain parity.
In Lewiston Firefighters Association, Local 785 v. City of Lewiston, \32
the Supreme Court of Maine invalidated the use of parity clauses in public employment contracts by adopting the rationales of Doyle v. City of
Troy 133 and Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations Board. 134 In
Lewiston Firefighters Association, a city charter granted collective bargaining rights to firemen and provided for parity between police and firemen. 135 Based upon that charter, the firemen's collective bargaining
agreement with Lewiston contained a passive parity clause.136 A state
130. C. SMITH, J. MERRIFIELD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
LABOR ARBITRATION, 103, 103-04 (1970). Most statutes provide for the resolution
of interests dispute impasses through binding arbitration. In lieu of a strike or other
economic action, the parties submit their impasse to a neutral third party who then
resolves the impasse. See Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 540 v. Mercer County
Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978).
131. See 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970), rev'd, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2634 (N.Y.), on remand, 76
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971); supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
132. 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976).
133. 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976); see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying
text.
134. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976); see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
135. 354 A.2d at 157.
136. [d.
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statute passed subsequent to execution of the agreement provided for collective bargaining for all state employees. \37 Citing this state statute, the
contract reference unit, the police, sought judicial invalidation of both
the ordinance and the parity clause of the collective bargaining
agreement. 138
The court held, as had Doyle, that the ordinance was invalid because
it clearly was inconsistent with the state statute. 139 In determining that
the two laws were inconsistent, the court examined the collective bargaining scheme envisioned by the state legislature. 140 Adopting the same
rationale as that utilized in Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations
Board, the court found that the focal point of the state legislation was the
exclusivity of each bargaining unit;141 each unit represented an identifiable community of interests and only exclusive representatives could bargain for those interests. 142
Citing the need for distinct units of bargaining, the court invalidated
the parity pay provisions of both the ordinance and the collective bargaining agreement. The court held that by imposing the interests of the
Lewiston Firefighters upon the Lewiston Police the parity pay provisions
evaded the collective bargaining procedures mandated by state statute. 143
The court's rationale is noteworthy because it provides a different
view of the traditional invalidation argument. The majority of cases invalidating parity provisions reason that a parity clause interferes with the
untrammeled bargaining rights of the reference unit. 144 The Doyle court,
however, cited the interference of the parity provision with the community of interest of clearly defined units. Although both rationales focus
upon the role of units in the collective bargaining process, the rationales
are distinguishable. The first rationale authorizes a parity clause if the
reference unit consents. The second rationale holds that any parity provision is invalid per se as contrary to the statutory scheme, regardless of
consent by the reference unit.
In 1977, the New York State Public Employment Relations Board
went beyond the holding of In re City of Albany, 145 which had held passive parity provisions permissive but not mandatory subjects of bargaining, and held in In re City of New York 146 that passive parity provisions
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Jd.
[d. at 158.
Jd. at 159; Doyle, 51 A.D. at 849, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n, 354 A.2d at 160-61.
/d. at 161.
[d.
[d.
See supra notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
7 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 7-3079, 587 GOy'T EMPL. REI.. REP. (BNA) B-12
(1976); see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
146. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. '1 10-3003,694 GOY'T EMPI.. REI.. REP. (BNA) 42
( 1977).
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are prohibited subjects of bargaining. 147 In In re City of New York, the
police union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city, challenging a parity pay provision in the city's collective bargaining agreements with firefighters and sanitation workers. The provision cited the
police unit as the reference unit. Holding this parity provision to be prohibited, the Board relied upon Local 1219 v. Labor Board 148 and Doyle v.
City of Troy. 149 Utilizing the rationale of Local 1219 v. Labor Board, the
Board found that the parity provision interfered with the untrammeled
bargaining rights of the reference union, because the reference union was
compelled by the provision to negotiate for both unions. 150 In concert
with Doyle v. City of Troy, the Board found that the parity provision
circumvented the state statutory collective bargaining scheme by limiting
the negotiating duties of the city. 151 Although the objection based on the
interference argument could be remedied by the consent of the reference
unit, the Board's objection based on the conclusion that parity clauses
contravene the city's statutory duty to negotiate could not be remedied
by the consent of the reference union. ls2
In its summary, the Board stated that its conclusion was consistent
with Board of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teachers, J53 which
mandated a broad scope of collective bargaining, including all possible
wage terms. IS4 The Board stated that notwithstanding the broad scope
of collective bargaining "the scope of negotiations is limited by plain and
clear prohibitions in statutory or decisional law and by public policy
'whether derived from and whether implicit in statute or decisional law,
or both.' "155
147. [d. at ~ 10-3009,694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 43 (citing Local 1219 v.
Labor Board, 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976».
148. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976).
149. 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976).
150. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at ~ 10-3009, 694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at
43.
151. [d. at ~ 10-3009,694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 44. The Board explained
the limiting effect of the parity provision in the following manner:
The city, by entering into "parity" agreements, has diminished its financial
ability to grant benefits to employees represented by PBA beyond the formulas contained in the agreements negotiated with the intervenors [(firemen and sanitation workers)]. In brief, the "parity" agreement inhibits
the public employer from evaluating or negotiating over PBA demands on
their merits, but requires it to view PBA demands in light of the "parity"
agreement. Inevitably, this interferes with the negotiation rights of PBA.
[d. at 11 10-3009, 694 GOY'T EMPL. REL. REP. at 43.
152. [d. at 11 10-3011,694 GOY'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 45.
153. 30 N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
154. [d. at 122,282 N.E.2d at 109,331 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
155. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at 1110-3011, 694 GOV'T EMPI.. REI.. REI'. (BNA) at
45 (quoting Susquehanna Valley School Dis!. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers
Ass'n., 37 N.Y.2d at 616-17, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429): SCI! slipra
notes 34-35, 38-39 and accompanying text for discussion of cases thaI limit the
scope of collective bargaining provided for under Board of Edllc. of Hlil/til/gtol/. 30
N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).

1986]

Parity Bargaining in the Public Sector

435

What the Board ignored, however, is that, although the prohibition
need not be explicit and definitive it must be "plain and clear." 156 This is
what board member Ida Klaus stated in an emphatic dissent. 157 Klaus
noted that the parity provision was not prohibited by any plain and clear
provisions of the state statute or decisionallaw}58 Moreover, according
to Klaus, parity clauses promote several important public interests including wage stability, union security, and early resolution of disputes. 159
Klaus concluded that the long history of parity acceptance,160 other jurisdictions' acceptance of parity in private and public sector cases,161 and
the nonimposition of wage terms upon reference unions by a passive parity clause 162 combine to tip the scales in favor of acceptance of parity
under the broad scope of collective bargaining espoused in Huntington.
The Board failed to address Klaus's reference to the NLRB case,
Dolly Madison Industries, Inc. 163 The reasoning of Dolly Madison directly contradicts the Board's conclusion that the parity scheme precludes meaningful implementation of negotiating rights and, thus,
contravenes the federal statutory scheme for collective bargaining. 164 In
Dolly Madison the NLRB concluded that, because the parity scheme did
not impose any contract terms on a reference unit, the parties were free to
negotiate all terms; therefore, the employer's duty to negotiate under the
NLRA was not breached. 165 The NLRA section at issue in Dolly
Madison was very similar to the state statute at issue in In re City of New
156. 37 N.Y.2d at 616-17, 339 N.E.2d at 133,376 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (quoting Syracuse
Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 320 N.E.2d 646, 646, 361
N.Y.S.2d 912,912 (1974».
157. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at ~ 10-3012,694 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at
45-46.
158. [d.
159. !d. Klaus stated that:
Recourse to such clauses may reasonably serve to promote the early resolution of bargaining disputes and the timely conclusion of an agreement by
affording the necessary assurance to the contracting union that it will not
risk less favorable treatment by an early settlement as against those in
other units who may play for the competitive advantage of a long waitand-see policy. Thus, the strains and uncertainties of a protracted hiatus
between contracts, and their inevitable threat to labor peace and the conduct of the governmental function, may well be avoided by the mechanism
of the parity clause.
[d.
160. !d.
161. See Dolly Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970); West Allis Professional Policemen's Ass'n v. City of West Allis, No. XX. 17300. MP-294. Dec. No. 12706
(Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n May 17, 1974), discussed at 563 GOV'T EM .. l.. REI.. REI'.
(BNA) B-7 (1974).
162. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at 1i 10-3011,694 Gov'T EMI'l.. REI .. REI'. (BNA) at
46.
163. 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970); see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
164. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at'l 10-3011,694 Gov'T EM .. L. Rl'l .. REP. (BNA) at
45.
165. 182 N.L.R.B. at 1038.

436

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

York. 166 Although decisions involving the NLRA are not binding on
public sector bargaining decisions, 167 Dolly Madison is persuasive authority.168 By failing to address the reasoning of Dolly Madison, especially
after it was raised in the dissenting opinion of board member Klaus, the
Board left its conclusions open to question. Because the Board neglected
to address Dolly Madison, commentators and other labor boards are unable to discern whether the Board distinguished its decision from Dolly
Madison on either factual or legal grounds. Hence, when labor boards
attempt to resolve issues of parity bargaining, In Re City of New York
should be recognized as being of dubious precedential value.
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board also has declared parity
clauses prohibited subjects of bargaining. 169 Pennsylvania had restructured its existing wage agreement with one union to correspond to the
terms of an earlier agreement negotiated with another union. The Board
relied upon Local 1219 v. Labor Board, 170 In re City of New York,171 and
In re Town of Methuen, 172 and held that the restructuring was equivalent
to a parity agreement and therefore was illegal. 173 The Board found that
the parity provision imposed equality for the future upon another group
that had no part in making the agreement. It found that the inevitable
tendency of such agreements was to interfere with the rights of the reference union to enjoy untrammeled bargaining. 174 The Board concluded
166. 29 V.S.c. § IS8(a)(5) (1982) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 V.S.c. § 159(a)
(1982) provides the requirements for choosing bargaining representatives. N.Y.
CIV. SERVo LAW § 209-a(I)(d) (McKinney 1983) provides: "It shall be an improper
practice for a public employer or its agents deliberately ... to refuse to negotiate in
good faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its public
employees. "
167. N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 209-a(3) (McKinney 1983) provides that "[i]n applying
this section, fundamental distinctions between private and public employment shall
be recognized, and no body of federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to
private employment, shall be regarded as binding or controlling precedent." !d.
168. The fundamental differences cited in N.Y. Civ. SERVo LAW § 209-a(3) (Consoi.
1973) do not apply to the refusal to bargain issue. In N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 209a(I)(d) (Consoi. 1973) refusal to bargain cases, the sole issue is whether there is a
refusal to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., Board of Coop. Educ. Servo V. New
York Pubi. Empi. ReI. Bd., 82 A.D.2d 691, 444 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1981); International
Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 589 V. Helsby, 59 A.D.2d 342,399 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1977).
Refusal to negotiate in good faith is also the issue addressed in cases decided under
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. See Dolly Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970).
169. P.L.R.B. V. Commonwealth, PERA-C-7323-C, slip op. at 1 (Penn. Lab. ReI. Bd.
Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20 (1978).
170. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 114-20.
171. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 10-3003, 694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 42
(1977); see supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
172. Mass. Lab. ReI. Comm'n No. MUPS07, slip op. at I, discussed at GOY'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) B-15 (1974).
173. P.L.R.B. v. Commonwealth, No. PERA-C-7323-C, slip op. at 8 (Penn. Lab. ReI.
Bd. Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOY'T EMPL. REL. REI'. (BNA) 20-21 (1978).
174. [d.

1986]

Parity Bargaining in the Public Sector

437

that parity arrangements adversely affect the reference union by depriving the union of its full right to good faith bargaining in violation of the
state statute. 175 The Board decided the "double-Ioading"176 of the reference union was an undue burden, even though the parity clause did not
impose any terms upon the reference union. 177 The decision thus repeated the mistakes of its predecessors by equating passive parity with
active parity.178
V.

PUBLIC SECTOR DECISIONS VALIDATING
PARITY AGREEMENTS

The same year that the New York City Board of Collective Bargaining was reviewing the parity agreement in In re Uniformed Fire Officers
Association,179 the United States District Court for the District of Louisiana upheld the enforcement of parity agreements in Cooperative Street
Railway Shop Employees Association v. New Orleans Public Service Commission. 180 There, the defendant public utility had executed agreements
with six bargaining units. The agreements provided for parity among the
units. 181 When subsequent negotiations produced higher wages for one
of the reference units, the contracting units sought higher wages through
enforcement of the parity clause. In enforcing the oral representations
regarding parity, the court considered the substantial labor policy promoting parity. The court held that "the evidence is persuasive that such
oral agreements are also intended to induce the several unions to sign
written contracts and to give them and their members a sense of security
that, if others do better later, those who reach accord earlier will not
suffer." 182 This sense of security is one of the beneficial factors of passive
175. Id.
176. For a discussion of the "double-loading" concept, see supra text accompanying
notes 91-97.
177. P.L.R.B. v. Commonwealth, No. PERA-C-7323-C, slip. op. at 8 (Penn. Lab. ReI.
Bd. Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20-21 (1978).
178. For a discussion of active versus passive parity, see supra notes 30-31, 70-81 and
accompanying text.
179. Nos. BCB-116-72, BCB-118-72, Dec. No. B-14-72 (N.Y. City Bd. of Collective Bargaining, Aug. 2, 1972).
180. 352 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. La. 1972).
181. /d. at 1101.
[I]f any of the other five labor organizations representing [New Orleans
Public Service, Inc.]'s employees obtained a general wage increase in excess of the one negotiated by Shop Employees, the employees represented
by Shop Employees would be entitled to an additional increase to equalize
their general wage adjustment with the increase paid to the other labor
organization, unless the increase resulted from arbitration. A similar
agreement had usually been made in the past with each union. These compacts, taken together, equalized all general wage increases whether a particular union was the first or last to reach an agreement with [New Orleans
Public Service, Inc.] ....
Id.
182. /d. at 1102.
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parity noted in the dissent of Ida Klaus in In re City of New York. 183
In West Allis Professional Policemen's Association v. City of West Allis,184 the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) upheld a parity pay provision between the city and firefighters. That
provision tied the firemen's wages to the policemen's wages. 18S In its
unfair labor practice charge, the police union asserted that the parity
provision unlawfully interfered with and restrained its statutory right to
free and untrammeled bargaining. 186
The WERC cited several reasons for upholding the parity provision:
(1) the historical acceptance and usage of parity agreements;187 and (2)
the parity provision did not interfere with the rights of the reference
union because the provision imposed no wage settlement on the reference
union. 188 The Commission thus implicitly distinguished active parity
from passive parity.
The most compelling reason that WERC offered was the "fact of
life" argument. 189 The Commission noted that absent a formal parity
clause, management weighs the economic cost of its bargaining decision.
A grant to one unit necessarily involves consideration of granting of an
equivalent benefit to a comparable unit. 19o In reviewing this managerial
decision-making process, the Commission noted that "the normal, unformalized considerations of employers, on the other hand, are very compelling, not only because of cost considerations, but because of very
significant tactical considerations that an employer dealing with a
number of unions must make respecting the relative positions of such
unions."191 The WERC concluded that this de facto parity process, the
weighing of consequences absent a formal parity clause, is such a "fact of
life" in collective bargaining that to distinguish the de facto from the de
jure parity process, the weighing of consequences occasioned by the presence of a parity clause, is artificial and unnecessarily legalistic. 192
A comparison of the West Allis decision with that of the Connecti-

,m

183. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd.
10-3003, 10-3011, 694 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) 42, 45 (1977) (Klaus, dissenting); see supra notes 156-68 and accompanying
text.
184. No. XX, 17300, MP-294, Dec. No. 12706, slip op. at 1 (Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n
May 17, 1974), discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-7 (1974).
185. !d., slip op. at 2-3, discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-7.
186. !d., slip op. at 4, discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-7. The
police union's argument that the parity provision interfered with its statutory bargaining rights was asserted successfully in cases that declared parity clauses prohibited subjects of bargaining. See supra notes 85-178 and accompanying text.
187. No. XX, 17300, MP-294, Dec. No. 12206, slip op. at 5 (Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n
May 17, 1974), discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-7.
188. !d.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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cut Labor Relations Board in In re City of New London 193 shows that an
understanding of the "fact of life" theory is essential to a proper analysis
of passive parity. Unlike WERC in West Allis, the Connecticut Board
found that, despite the existence of morally-obligated or de facto parity,
legally obligated or de jure parity interfered with the bargaining rights of
the reference union. 194
The Connecticut Board dismissed the "fact of life" argument by distinguishing de facto parity from de jure parity.195 The Board reasoned
that, because the parity clause legally bound the city to give the contracting union whatever is later given to the reference union and required
that such concessions be made at the time of the making of the reference
union's contract, the presence of the parity clause deterred the city from
granting the reference unit more than that which the contracting unit
already had. 196 The corollary of this reasoning is, absent the parity
agreement, the natural political pressures will not deter the city from
granting one bargaining unit more than another. This implies that the
wages of one unit always are considered in a vacuum. The weakness of
this argument is that no prudent employer will refuse to consider the
expansive consequences of his negotiations. 197
The WERC decision in West Allis more reasonably reflects the true
dynamics at work in the negotiating process. Employers will evaluate
any wage concession in light of its aggregate effect on competing unions.
This is particularly true in the public sector, where the government is
answerable not only to economic market forces, but also to the political
structure of the democratic process. 198 If the elected officials of a city
appear to be favoring one unit over another, the officials have to face not
only the members of the other unit, but the conscience of the voters. In
fact, in response to such pressures, some municipal employers have "voluntarily reopened contracts in order to restore parity during the life of
the contract."199
193. Case Nos. MPP-2268 & MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128 (Conn. St. Bd. of Lab. ReI.
Apr. 10, 1973), 505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-l (1979).
194. Id., slip op. at 4,505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at F-4.
195. /d.
196.Id.
197. For a discussion of management's thought processes in collective bargaining, including an evaluation of the Professional Air Traffic Controller's Organization
(PATCO) strike, see X. FRASCOGNA & H. HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRATEGY FOR LAWYERS 14-16 (1984).
198. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227-28 (1977); Summers, Public
Sector Bargaining: Problems o/Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV.
669, 670 (1975).
199. In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268 & MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128,
slip op. at 4 (Conn. St. Bd. of Lab. Rel.), 505 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-l,
F-4 (1979). Despite the contracting union's introduction of evidence on this issue,
the Connecticut Board refused to accept the argument, noting that the evidence did
not show that the practice was uniform or general, and that "[t]he firefighters'
stance in this very case strongly suggests that they are unwilling to rely on the
inevitability which [sic] their argument presupposes." Id.
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In City of Detroit v. Killingsworth,2°O a Michigan circuit court upheld an arbitrator's award of parity. The arbitrator's award granted firemen a fixed percentage raise or an amount equal to the wage benefits
negotiated later between Detroit and the police, whichever package was
greater. 201 The city appealed the arbitrator's decision and argued, inter
alia, that the award was beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator because
the award was not finite. 202 The police union intervened, claiming that
the parity provision interfered in their negotiating rights. 203
In dismissing Detroit's argument, the court held that the award was
not indefinite. Rather, the court reasoned that an award prescribing a
wage scale that fluctuates on some outside factor does not lack definiteness or finality if the factor is itself fixed or readily determinable. 204 In
addressing the police union's claim, the court made two observations:
that parity clauses have a long history of usage and adoption within both
private and public employment;205 and that although the parity provision
would inhibit the police unit's negotiations, the rule of law that the
courts favor settlement of disputes outweighed that effect.206 The court
reasoned that, because there is no difference between vertical and horizontal parity and the police union vigorously supported its right to vertical parity, the intervenor was estopped from complaining of any unlawful
interference. 207 The court noted that the parity clause acted as a contingency clause, common to both private industry and public employment,
to determine and fix wages among different employees performing similar
types of employment. 208 Although the court did not use the language
expressly, its rationale is essentially the same as that expressed in the
"fact of life" language of West Allis.209
In In re City of Detroit,210 the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission expanded upon the "economic facts of life" argument in
municipal bargaining. Following the upholding of the arbitrator's award
in City of Detroit v. Killingsworth,211 another arbitrator had mandated
parity between firemen and policemen, as well as between supervisors
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2752 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972).
/d. at 2753.
Id. at 2756.
/d. at 2753.
/d. at 2756.
/d.
/d. at 2757.
/d.
/d. at 2756.
West Allis Professional Policemen's Ass'n v. City of West Allis, No. XX, 17300,
MP-24, Dec. No. 12706, slip op. at 5 (Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n May 17, 1974),
discussed at 563 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-7 (1974).
210. No. C72 A-I, slip op. at 1053 (Mich. Empl. ReI. Comm'n July 24. 1972), discussed
at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REI.. REP. (BNA) B-9 (1972).
211. 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2752 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972); see supra notes 189-209 and accompanying text.
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and police. 212 During negotiations with the police union, the city had
insisted upon an economic package consistent with parity among
firemen. 213
The police union filed an unfair labor practice, charging that the
City of Detroit's insistence upon parity interfered with the union's free
and untrammeled bargaining rights. 214 In denying the charge, the Commission held that an employer does not refuse to bargain if, during the
collective bargaining, it "considers" the impact of wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment of one bargaining unit on any
other bargaining unit.215
The Commission further recognized that a public employer must
determine the effect of one bargaining unit's contract on any other unit
because the city, like other large employers, recognizes relationships between salaries. 216 In fact, the Commission not only recognized that such
considerations are economic "facts of life," but it acknowledged that to
foreclose such considerations would impose an undue hardship upon the
parties. 217
The most recent decision to approve parity was issued by the Court
of Appeals of New York in Niagara Wheatfield Administrators v. Niagara Wheatfield. 218 In that case, school administrators had executed a
collective bargaining agreement that tied their salaries to those of teachers.219 After expiration of the contract and during negotiations for a new
agreement, the reference teacher unit received a salary increase. 22o Relying upon the tie-in provision of the expired contract, the administrators
sought a salary increase in order to maintain the salary ratio specified in
the expired contract.2 21
When the school board refused to adjust wages the administrators
filed a grievance, which led to arbitration. When the arbitrator ordered
compliance with the tie-in provision, the school board filed suit alleging,
inter alia, that the tie-in provision was against public policy and therefore
212. No. e72 A-I, slip op. at 1056, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at
B-lO.
213. Id., slip op. at lOSS, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-9.
214. Id., slip op. at lOSS-56, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-9, B10.
215. Id., slip op. at 1056, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-1!.
216. Id., slip op. at 1057, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-1!.
217. Id., slip op. at 1057, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-II.
Taking a sample of the testimony adduced at the hearing, the commission noted:
Mr. Freemont was asked on cross-examination by counsel for DPOA:
"Now, would this be a fair statement: that the City of Detroit did not
negotiate wages and other fringe benefits with the DPOA without taking
into consideration the additional cost for wages to be paid the firefighters
and the lieutenants and sergeants?" Mr. Freemont answered "Yes."
Id. (emphasis supplied by the commission).
218. 44 N.Y.2d 68, 375 N.E.2d 37, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1978).
219. Id. at 71, 375 N.E.2d at 39, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
220.Id.
221. Id.
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was illegal. 222 The school board argued that the tie-in provision emasculated the board's ability to effectively negotiate a new contract. 223
The court rejected the school board's argument and enforced the tiein provision. In addressing general public policy, the court noted that
"we must first observe that the tie-in provision is not offensive to public
policy. . .. Neither can it be said at this time that continuation of the tiein provision during the period of contract negotiations contravenes public policy. "224 The court next addressed the effect of the provision on the
negotiating position of the school board. The court held that "although
the bargaining position of the association is thereby bolstered, the school
board's ability to negotiate effectively has not been so encumbered that it
has, in essence, lost control over this important facet of its operation. "225
The court, by express and implied reasoning, rejected the two principal arguments asserted against parity agreements. First, the court held
that the parity provision did not circumvent the employer's duty to fully
negotiate. The employer must negotiate on each provision proposed by
the union. The agreement to adjust future wages by means of an external
force, rather than through negotiations, did not act as an unlawful delegation of the negotiating authority.
The court also implied that the provision does not restrain or interfere with the untrammeled bargaining rights of the teachers' union by
forcing them to negotiate for themselves and the administrators. The
court noted that, although the agreement guaranteed salary increments
to association members upon an increase in teachers' salaries, nothing in
the agreement assured that teachers' salaries would be increased substantially or even at all. 226
The court further observed that the school board's voluntary agreement to raise teachers' salaries during the period of negotiations with the
association, thereby raising association members' salaries, hardly demonstrated that the school board had lost control over its negotiations with
the association. 227 In essence, the court held that tie-in provisions are
economic "facts of life" that enhance the bargaining position of the contracting union without emasculating the duties of the employer or interfering with the negotiating rights of the reference union.
In City of Schenectady v. City Firefighters' Union,228 the Supreme
Court of New York addressed the legality of parity pay clauses at the
request of the firefighters' union which requested that the court enforce
an arbitration award which required wage parity between firefighters and
police. The supreme court followed the analysis provided by the Court
222. Id. at 72, 375 N.E.2d at 39, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
223. Id. at 73, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
224. Id. at 73, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
225. /d. at 73-74, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
226.Id.
227.Id.
228. 85 A.D.2d 116, 448 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1982).
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of Appeals of New York in Niagara Wheatfield 229 and rejected a rule
that would permit per se invalidation of parity clauses. Instead, the
court adopted a rule which allows for case-by-case examination of parity
provisions in the context of the circumstances in each case. 230
The court specifically rejected two public policy arguments which
often are advanced by opponents of parity bargaining:
(1) [A] provision requiring parity for all such groups inhibits
a public employer from entering into later negotiations with
one of the groups on the merits of [that group's] particular demand and thus limits "the full range of negotiations to which
the City is entitled under [its statutory scheme]" and (2) once
having negotiated additional benefits for one group, the employer is foreclosed from negotiating on the demands for equality of treatment by other groups entitled to parity under the
agreement. 231

In acting to enforce the terms of the arbitration award, the court noted
that parity clauses serve a legitimate public policy and do not "straightjacket" the parties during subsequent negotiations. 232 This aspect of City
of Schenectady illustrates the common sense approach found in public
and private sector cases that have validated passive parity clauses.
City of Schenectady potentially is distinguishable from other passive
parity cases on the basis of one critical aspect of its analysis. The court,
by basing its holding in part on the joint negotiations conducted by the
negotiating unit, the reference unit, and the employer,233 interjects by
implication a requirement that the reference unit consent to the parity
agreement between the contracting unit and the employer. The court's
holding effectively has compromised the heretofore untrammeled bargaining rights of the contracting unit. In effect, the rule enunciated in
City of Schenectady provides the reference unit with free rein to interfere
with and even coerce contracting units attempting to exercise their negotiating rights.
The requirement that the negotiating unit obtain consent from the
reference unit also compromises unit exclusivity. Utilization of this re229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See supra text accompanying notes 218-27.
85 A.D.2d at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
Id. at 118,448 N.Y.S.2d at 8089.
Id.
Id. at 117,448 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The court specifically noted that the employer, the
City of Schenectady, had agreed to accept the passive parity clause only after completing joint negotiations with the contracting and reference units. Id. Furthermore, the court based its validation of passive parity, in large part, upon
Schenectady's eventual resolution of its contract dispute with the reference unit. Id.
at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 809. These facts have led one commentator to conclude
that City of Schenectady stands for the proposition that parity bargaining is lawful
only where the reference unit consents to the arrangement. See Note, The Negotiability of Parity Agreements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 11 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 139, 157 (1982).
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quirement allows the reference unit to give what amounts to final approval to a parity provision secured by the negotiating unit.
Although City of Schenectady upholds the parity clause, the court's
analysis is seriously flawed. Utilization of reference unit consent unduly
restrains the employer and the negotiating unit in the conduct of their
labor relations and distorts unit exclusivity. Hence, City of Schenectady
should be accorded minimal persuasive merit in resolving parity bargaining issues.
VI.

THE DISTINCTION IN VIEWS

The majority view is that parity agreements in the public sector are
prohibited. Employment relations boards in Massachusetts,234 Connecticut,235 Pennsylvania,236 and New York,237 as well as courts in Connecticut,238 New York,239 and Maine 240 have invalidated those provisions
with two common themes (1) because the reference unit necessarily must
negotiate on behalf of the contracting unit, parity provisions inherently
thrust such additional economic burdens upon the reference unit that the
ability of the reference unit to negotiate freely their own demands has
been restrained 241 and (2) the effect of any parity agreement is to equalize
the benefits between the contracting and reference units, thus removing
the reference unit's right to bargain with respect to the terms covered by
the parity agreement. 242
The minority view recognizes that, because all parties to the bargaining process bring various economic burdens to the bargaining table,
an employer is compelled to examine its concessions to one party in light
of its future effect on other parties. 243 Unions also realize this economic
"fact of life" in selecting those provisions to be advanced at the bargaining table. In contrast to the unrealistic de jure versus de facto distinction
espoused by the majority, the minority view captures the reality of the
234. In re Town of Methuen, No. MUP-507, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Lab. ReI. Comm'n Jan.
24, 1974), discussed at 545 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-15 (1974).
235. In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268 and MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128
(Conn. St. Bd. of Lab. ReI. Apr. 10, 1973),505 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-l
(1973).
236. P.L.R.B. v. Commonwealth, No. PERA-C-7323, slip op. at 1 (Penn. Lab. ReI. Bd.
Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20 (1978).
237. In re City of New York, 10 N.Y. Publ. Empl. ReI. Bd., ~~ 10-3003, 10-3011, 694
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 42, 45 (1977) (Klaus, dissenting).
238. Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor ReI. Bd., 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976);
Local 1522 v. Connecticut Labor ReI. Bd., 31 Conn. Supp. 15,319 A.2d 511 (1973).
239. Doyle v. City of Troy, 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976); Voight v. Bowen,
53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1976).
240. Firefighters Ass'n Local 785 v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976).
241. G. NIERENBERG, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING 48,54 (1968).
242. See X. FRANSCOGNA & H. HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRATEGY FOR LAWYERS 14, 16(1984).
243. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156,
1159, 1167-68 (1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits o/Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1119 (1969).
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collective bargaining process. Both the employer and union engage in
economic "fact of life" considerations and deliberations. The minority
position, however, is correct: The passive parity agreement does not create, economic "facts of life;" it merely crystallizes them in written form.
The majority view is founded upon an erroneous "but for" argument. The argument is premised on the view that but for the passive
parity clause the municipal employer would examine only the merits of
the reference unit's proposals. This is an unrealistic view. Every employer, or for that matter any negotiating principal, examines all the consequences of its bargaining decisions. These external consequences are
not limited to competing unions; rather, they may extend to financiers,
stockholders, and taxpayers. Thus, even absent a passive parity clause,
an employer will not bargain over union proposals in a vacuum.
The majority view is also flawed fatally due to some shallow legal
analysis. The majority view concludes that the effect of the parity clause
is to equalize the benefits among the contracting and the reference union,
which "straight-jackets" the reference union in its own bargaining. This
conclusion is based only upon the effects of parity and does not consider
the means undertaken to gain those effects. The majority view thus fails
to distinguish among the various types of parity clauses.
The minority view classifies parity as either active or passive.
Although the effect of equalization is common to both parities, the methods of equalization are different. An active parity clause requires the
employer to impose the wage terms of the contracting unit upon the reference unit. The minority view, in agreement with the majority view,
holds these clauses to be illegal because such a contractual imposition
strips the reference unit of any meaningful bargaining opportunities. The
evil is not the resulting equality of contracts, but the means taken to
achieve the result: the use of an active parity clause.
In contrast to the majority, the minority's analysis has identified the
passive parity clause. As with the active parity clause, the effect of a
passive parity clause is equality of contracts between the contracting and
reference unions. The passive parity clause, however, accomplishes
equality by requiring that any superior benefits earned by the reference
unit be applied to the contracting unit. The reference unit is free to negotiate as to all subjects. The only limitations are those imposed by the
market.
In addition to the foregoing factual and legal arguments, strong public policy reasons support the validity of passive parity agreements. The
basic policy of the national labor laws is to minimize the disruption to
commerce caused by labor strife by promoting collective bargaining. 244
244. "The theory of the Act [NLRA] is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of the employees is likely to promote industrial peace and
may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not
attempt to compel." N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45
(1937).
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To accomplish this goal, courts have recognized that the lawful scope of
collective bargaining subjects is quite broad. 24s Thus, as demonstrated in
the discussion of the private sector cases,246 the scope of lawful collective
bargaining subjects includes passive parity agreements.
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,247 the Supreme Court commented upon the lawfulness of parity agreements by holding that uniformity of labor standards is a legitimate aim of any national labor
organization. In General Teamsters, Warehouse & Dairy Employees, Local Union 126,248 the NLRB declared that a passive parity clause was a
lawful subject of mandatory bargaining because the clause affected wages
as a fluctuating structure similar to a cost of living index. In Dolly
Madison Industries,249 the NLRB validated a passive parity clause because the moving party intended only to assure that its agreed-upon wage
structure was not disadvantaged by any subsequent wage package won
by a competitor. In short, because of the mutual assurances involved, the
use of passive parity clauses has promoted earlier contract agreements
and has led to labor stability in the private sector.
As in the private sector, the validity of a passive parity provision
found in a collective agreement negotiated by a public employer turns
upon whether the provision constitutes a term or condition of employment. 2S0 In the event the parity provision constitutes a term or condition
of employment, the public employer must negotiate the inclusion of such
term or condition and, upon reaching an understanding, must incorporate the parity provision into the collective agreement absent some statutory provision to the contrary.2SI
These statutory prohibitions arise not from the uniqueness of public
employees or from the work they perform, but from the unique nature of
the government in the role of employer. 2s2 Unlike the private sector employer, the government, as a decision-making body, must comply with a
multitude of constitutions, statutes, and ordinances and must answer ultimately to various participants in the democratic process. 2S3
Perhaps the primary countervailing reason for enacting such
prohibitions in the private sector is to protect an employer's ability to
remain competitive in the marketplace; however, the need for orderly
functioning of a democratic form of representative government and the
245. See Board of Educ. of Huntington v. Associated Teachers, 30 N. Y.2d 122, 130, 282
N.E.2d 169, 173,331 N.Y.S.2d 17,23 (1972).
246. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text.
247. 381 U.S. 657 (1965); see supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
248. 176 N.L.R.B. 406 (1969); see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
249. 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970); see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
250. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d at 128,282 N.E.2d at 112,331
N.Y.S.2d at 21.
251. [d.
252. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems o/Governmental Decisionmaking, 44
U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1975).
253. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227-28 (1977); Summers, supra
note 252, at 669-73.
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preservation of the right of elected representatives to make budgetary
allocations free from the disruptive activities of its public employees require statutory prohibitions in the public sector. 254 Thus, for example, to
insure the uninterrupted functioning of government, public employees
have been restricted in the exercise of the most basic concerted activity
- the right to strike. 255
There is no feature unique to government that justifies prohibiting
the use of parity clauses. Rather, there are important benefits to the government employer/employee relationship derived from the use of parity
clauses. Passive parity clauses produce stable labor relations by encouraging public employees to settle early.256 Such contractual provisions
provide the contracting union with the security that it will not be disadvantaged by signing early. This security is the key to productive labor
relations. 257 Further, parity agreements provide the governmental employer with the wage flexibility to recruit and retain the most competent
employees in a highly competitive market. 258 Finally, parity provides for
the uniform treatment of similarly situated employees. 259
VII.

CONCLUSION

The inclusion of an active parity clause in a contract between a labor
unit and an employer requires the employer to impose previously negotiated wage, benefit, and conditions of employment terms on the reference
labor unit during subsequent negotiations. Because an active parity
clause compromises the reference unit's right to engage in open, comprehensive bargaining with an employer, the clause clearly is an illegal subject of bargaining under the NLRA and state statutes patterned after the
NLRA.
The inclusion of a passive parity clause in a contract between a labor
unit and an employer does not impose terms on a subsequently negotiating reference unit. A passive parity clause merely maintains parity between a negotiating labor unit and the reference unit by passing on to the
negotiating unit enhanced benefits that are provided to the reference unit
by the employer during subsequent negotiations. A passive parity clause
does not impose previously negotiated terms on unwilling parties; accordingly, inclusion of a passive parity clause in a labor contract does not
compromise the untrammeled bargaining rights of the reference unit or
the employer.
254. City of New York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 186, 243 N.E.2d 128, 134, 295
N.Y.S.2d 901, 909 (1968).
255. Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 563, 251
N.E.2d 15, 18 (1969).
256. Cooperative St. Ry. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D.
La. 1972).
257. M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 1,2 (1965).
258. San Joaquin County Employees Ass'n v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App.3d 83,
88,113 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942, 2944 (1974).
259. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965).
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The use of passive parity clauses in public sector bargaining should
be encouraged, because passive parity clauses promote wage stability,
provide for increased union security, and permit governmental employers
to enjoy greater flexibility in dealing with their employees. Because they
promote such beneficial public interests, passive parity should be categorized as a mandatory subject of bargaining. Passive parity clauses merely
crystallize the "economic facts of life" of the collective bargaining process into contract form: All negotiating parties consider the comprehensive economic consequences of each bargaining proposal.

